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Non-Technical Summary
As of 2008, Germany has severely changed its thin capitalization rule by introducing the so-called interest barrier. This new rule aims at prohibiting tax avoidance of multinational rms by means of cross-border internal loans. For reasons of non-discrimination, the rule is, however, equally attributable on the national level and it is applicable to both internal and external debt. Since its beginning, the German interest barrier has had a very poor reputation as it was believed to distort nancing decisions and hereby harm production eciency.
Four years after its introduction, the time has come to empirically evaluate the interest barrier. In this paper, we trace to what extent the interest barrier impacted rms' nancing decisions. We distinguish between national and multinational rms as well as between the eects on internal debt to assets and external debt to assets.
Thin capitalization rules prevent rms from deducting excessive interest expenses from their tax base. Before 2008, the interest on internal debt going beyond 1.5 times the equity of the respective shareholder was not deductible. As of 2008, interest payments exceeding the interest earnings are generally only deductible at the amount of 30% of EBITDA once the exemption limit of an initial EUR 1 million is exceeded. In our empirical setup, we identify rms which would have been aected by the new interest barrier, had it already been in place in the years 2005 to 2007, i.e. before its actual coming into force. Then we analyze empirically how these rms adjusted their debt to assets ratios and their net interest payments as compared to the control group.
Our regressions show that the interest barrier drove rms to lower their debt to assets ratios and their net interest payments. Opposing its original intention, it seems to be, however, also the national rms which adjusted their capital structure and it was external rather than internal debt which was reduced. Therefore, we conclude that the interest barrier does indeed aect nancing decisions, but predominantly not in the intended way and not of the intended rms. In sensitivity analyses, we examine highly leveraged and low protable rms, which are likely to be subject to the interest barrier. The results suggest a debt-reducing interest barrier eect for these companies as well.
Our empirical evidence does not provide a positive evaluation of the new interest barrier. The legislator might have focused too much on the task of counteracting excessive and abusive internal lending by a few multinationals, whilst disregarding the eects on non-abusive rms.
Introduction
Not without a lack of irony, Homburg (2007) calls the interest barrier an unprecedented tax innovation. Even before its introduction in 2008, the German interest barrier had a very poor scientic reputation. Based on analytical considerations, it is supposed to distort nancing decisions, thus harming production eciency. It is said to drive into bankruptcy even those rms which have no intentions of abusive tax evasion whatsoever. According to Homburg (2007) , the German interest barrier combines maximal economic damage with minimal scal utility. The numerous critical articles on the German regulation did, however, not prevent Italy from introducing a very similar rule in the same year 2008.
Thin capitalization rules prevent rms from deducting interest from their tax base if certain conditions are met. Before 2008, the amount of (non-)deductible interest was determined by a rm's debt to equity ratio. The interest on internal debt going beyond 1.5 times the equity of the respective shareholder was not deductible. As of 2008, the deductibility of interest no longer depended on the ratio, but on interest payments. Generally speaking, interest payments exceeding the interest earnings are only deductible at the amount of 30% of EBITDA once the exemption limit of an initial EUR 1 million is exceeded. The new interest barrier rule covers all sources of interest and, unlike the previous rule, not only internal but also external debt. It has primarily been introduced to prohibit tax avoidance by multinationals. For reasons of non-discrimination, the rule is equally attributable on the national level. Non-deductible interest is recorded in an interest carryforward. Figure 1 below illustrates the functioning of the new interest barrier. Homburg (2007) is not the only -convincing -analytical paper which severely criticizes the interest barrier. , Bolik, Fuest and Ortmann-Babel (2010) , Eilers (2007) , Endres (2007) , Herzig and Bohn (2007) , Hey (2007) , Musil and Volmering (2008) , Stangl and Rödder (2007) Töben (2007) and Welling (2007) draw similarly negative conclusions. German politicians have reacted to this critique by slightly relaxing the interest barrier in 2009, when they retroactively increased the exemption amount from EUR 1 million to EUR 3 million and also enlarged the tolerance range of the so-called escape clause, comparing the rm's leverage to the group's leverage.
Four years after its introduction, the time has come to empirically evaluate the interest barrier. Aected rms might either be struck by the interest barrier or might have taken evasive actions. Our empirical estimations are based on Bureau van Dijk's DAFNE database, which is a detailed subgroup of the Amadeus database covering German companies. We dierentiate by rm characteristics, by industry and by dierent kinds of debt. Cf. Winkeljohann and Fuhrmann (2007) . As of 2009, the tax allowance was increased to EUR 3 million and the company leverage could exceed the group leverage by 2%.
We nd that the interest barrier made rms lower their debt to assets ratios. Opposing its original intention, it was, however, also the national rms which adjusted their capital structure. In robustness checks, we nd interest barrier eects for highly leveraged rms and for companies with a low protability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a literature review. Thereafter, the eects of the thin capitalization legislation are worked out analytically in Section 3. This serves as the basis for our development of hypotheses in Section 4. Descriptive statistics are provided in Section 5, followed by the empirical approach in Section 6 and results in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
Literature Review
Ever since Miller (1958, 1963) published their theory of the capital structure of a rm, the tax advantage of debt nancing in contrast to equity nancing has been widely discussed in the literature. Modigliani and Miller argue that debt nancing is more advantageous than equity nancing since interest expenses are tax deductible. However, they also highlight that there are a lot of non-tax reasons inuencing the optimal nancing decision. As a result, they reject the idea that 100% debt nancing is usually the best choice. Further analytical research strengthened this position and revealed that it might not always be benecial to nance corporate undertakings with debt. Myers (1977) for example, argues that an already existing asset stock should rather be nanced with a higher percentage of debt compared to new growth opportunities.
Following the analytical approaches, multiple authors tried to show these eects empirically. MacKie-Mason (1990) as well as Graham (1999) nd positive eects of corporate tax rates on leverage by focusing on data about primary seasoned oerings. Lee (2001 and reveal a much larger eect that is particularly strong for small and for very large rms but not for medium-sized rms. Additionally, Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) can show that the eect varies with the source of debt. Their study on U.S. rms yields a higher responsiveness to tax-rate dierences of internal debt compared to external debt. Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème (2008) also provide support for the international debt and prot shifting of multinationals. The corporate tax rate eect on nancing decisions has been summarized in a literature review by Graham (2003) and in a meta study by Feld, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2011) . Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Graham (1999) , Alworth and Arachi (2001) and Overesch and Voeller (2010) do not only focus on the positive eect of corporate tax rates on the debt level, but also try to identify a proposed negative eect of high personal taxes on interest.
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Each of these studies is based on a dierent dataset and covers an international context. All of them clearly identify the proposed negative eect.
However, there are also studies that fail to identify either of the above mentioned eects or that stress other eects as relatively more important. Taub (1975) for example, nds a counterintuitive negative eect of higher corporate tax rates on debt nancing. Myers (1984) postulates that the past literature provided no convincing evidence on corporate taxes increasing the leverage. Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) nd that rm-specic leverage remains constant over a very long period of time, i.e. more than 20 years, concluding that the majority of variation in capital structure is time-invariant and that much of this variation is unaccounted for by existing empirical specications.
When it comes to the nancial eects of tax policy, one may wonder whether the measures to counter the eects described above were successful. Hauer and Runkel (2008) , Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) as well as Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber and Wamser (2008) all focus on the question of whether thin capitalization rules result in a reduction of internal debt and whether this increases scal revenues. Wamser (2008) focus on the introduction of the German thin capitalization rule in 1994 and its amendments in 2001 and 2004. All of these empirical studies nd evidence on a signicant reduction of internal debt following the introduction of a thin capitalization rule. However, they do not show that this reduction also resulted in a reduction of overall debt. They rather suggest that internal debt was substituted with external debt resulting in no increase in tax revenues.
As mentioned in the introduction, the emergence of the German interest barrier rule in 2007 was predominantly criticized in the German tax literature for being too far-reaching. Three elements of the interest barrier rule are heavily criticized. First of all, the rule is said to overshoot the mark because not only internal but also external debt nancing is limited (cf. Hey (2007) , Homburg (2007) ). Second, the interest barrier rule is seen as being harmful, especially to companies in nancial distress. It is argued that the interest barrier rule can result in high taxation for highly leveraged companies having low earnings. It might force companies which are in a loss situation before consideration of the rule into paying taxes, thus making their situations even worse. The interest barrier is therefore seen as reinforcing a crisis (cf. Endres (2007) , Grotherr (2008) , Herzig and Bohn (2007) , Hey (2007) , Köhler (2007 ), Schwarz (2008 ). Third, the so-called escape-clause is heavily criticized. It allows companies to escape the interest barrier rule if they can prove that the German company does not deviate from the equity-quota of the group, i.e. that the German business is not highly leveraged compared to the overall group. Dörer and Vogl (2007) , Endres (2007) , Ganssauge and Mattern (2008) , Grotherr (2008) , Thiel (2007) and Welling (2007) , however, see this equity test as highly complex and as bearing high administrative costs. Focusing on legal aspects, Führich (2007) , Hornig (2007) and Musil and Volmering (2008) argue that the interest barrier rule does not comply with EU-law and the German constitution.
Empirical enquiries of the interest barrier rule in Germany have, so far, mainly focused on two aspects. Bolik, Fuest and Ortmann-Babel (2010) as well as Herzig, Lochmann and Liekenbrock (2008) asked companies about their perception of the interest barrier rule and whether they are being harmed by it. Bolik, Fuest and Ortmann-Babel (2010) show that most companies conceptually reject the rule and the newly-introduced loss carryforward restrictions, and that companies expect a higher tax burden as a result of the new interest barrier rule. Herzig, Lochmann and Liekenbrock (2008) show that 43% of the companies expect to be harmed by the rule. The second aspect that has been traced empirically is which companies will be harmed by the rule. Though the expected numbers dier between 150 and 1511 companies, Bach and Buslei (2009) as well as expect the rule to be particularly harmful to large companies.
Even when the rule was adjusted in 2009, criticism continued. Rödding (2009) and Lenz, Doerer and Adrian (2010) argue that the equity-quota computation is still problematic and demand the conversion of the newly increased exemption limit of EUR 3 million into a tax allowance. Additionally, Herzig and Liekenbrock (2010) stress problems with the EBITDA-carryover.
General Analytics
Firms might lower their debt to assets ratios if the advantage of debt nancing decreases. We illustrate this by comparing the net present value of a debt nanced and an equity nanced investment.
If the investor provides equity to the rm, the net present value of the investment is given by
where EX 0 is the amount of investment, I t and EX t are the income and expenses in period t, DEP t is the amount of depreciation, i is the interest rate, and τ c and τ s are the tax rates for corporate prots on the rm and shareholder level. τ i is the tax rate on interest earnings. If the investor instead chooses to provide capital in the form of debt, the net present value is
where IN T t are interest expenses for debt provided by the investor and 0 < γ < 1 is the fraction of interest payments that is deductible from the corporate tax base. 4 γ equals 1 if no thin capitalization rules exist, but is < 1 if the company is aected by the interest barrier, for example. As the deductiblity of interest payments leads to a lower taxation than in the equity nanced investment where dividends are not tax-deductible, we see in equation (2) that the net present value of a debt nanced investment is always greater than the net present value of an equity nanced investment as long as some interest expenses are deductible from the corporate tax base, in particular as long as γ > τ i −τs (1−τs)τc . This means that rms generally have a tax-induced incentive to use debt rather than equity as a means of nancing. This result was rst developed by Modigliani and Miller (1963) . Opposing this tax advantage of debt nancing, there are other determinants of the capital structure choice like legal constraints, risk considerations and the availability of debt, leading to the fact that we do not exclusively observe debt nanced investments. The optimal fraction of debt, however, is supposed to be positively aected by the tax advantage. We are particularly interested in the eect of γ. Equation (2) shows that the tax advantage of debt increases in γ. Thus, assuming that the introduction of the interest barrier in Germany in 2008 leads to a decrease of γ, the relative advantage of debt nancing over equity nancing decreases and therefore the application of debt in the years after the reform is generally supposed to decrease.
To nd out for which rms the new interest barrier is more restrictive than the old debt to assets rule with its 1.5 internal debt to equity safe haven, we compare the interest expenses that are non-deductible under both rules on a company level. We rst take a look at the old rule. The non-deductible interest expenses (NDI) are given by
where i is the interest rate payable for debt, E is the equity of the considered company and λ is the fraction of total debt that is labeled as internal debt. As a result, the term in parantheses is the fraction of internal debt for which interest expenses are non-deductible 4 This result comes from
where only γ · IN T t are deductible from the corporate tax base and (1 − γ)IN T t , the part that is not deductible, is only deducted from the personal tax base. In addition, the interest payments received by the investor are fully taxed on the personal level.
under the old rule. Under the new rule, the amount of non-deductible interest is
Here, V are the lendings of the company given to other parties and EBIT DA are the earnings before interest and depreciation which is the sum of earnings before interest, EBIT , and the amount of depreciation in the considered period, DEP .
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In Figure 2 we show the non-deductible interest expenses as a percentage of total assets under the old (dashed lines) and the new rule (solid lines) as a function of the debt to assets ratio
We see that the slope of N DI old is higher than the one of N DI new . For given values of the protability r, which is dened as EBIT divided by total assets and determines N DI new and for λ, determining N DI old , we sometimes nd an intersection of both lines. From this critical value for the debt to assets ratio onwards, the old rule leads to a higher amount of non-deductible expenses than the new rule. This is the case where r and λ are relatively high, meaning protable rms with lots of internal debt. For rms with a lower protability which mainly have external debt in their balance sheet, N DI new is likely to be higher than N DI old . The analytical form for this critical value of the debt to assets ratio for which both rules lead to the same amount of non-deductible 5 We do not mention the exemptions of the new rule in this analytical part for the sake of simplicity. In addition, we assume that the interest rate is the same for both borrowing and lending. 6 V = 0 and the ratio of depreciation to total assets interest expenses is given by
If all interest expenses are deductible under the old rule, the debt to assets ratio, from which N DI new > 0, increases in protability, the lending-fraction and the depreciationfraction of assets. In addition, it decreases in the interest rate. If the old rule also restricts interest deductibility, the new rule is stricter than the old one if the debt to assets ratio is below a critical value depending on the same variables and, in addition, on λ. Solving for r leads to
If the old rule does not restrict interest deductibility, the critical value for r increases in the debt to assets ratio and the interest rate. In addition, it decreases in the lendingfraction and depreciation-fraction of assets. This is because the interest barrier rule looks at net interest expenses and compares them to earnings before depreciation. If some interest expenses are non-deductible under the old rule, the critical value for r also depends on the fraction of internal debt λ. Then, it decreases in D A if λ is xed. Figure  3 shows the run of the critical-r-curve as a function of D A for dierent λs. We can conclude that only specic rms are supposed to suer more from the new interest barrier than from the old debt to equity rule. As we can see in Figures 2 and 3 , the interest barrier is especially harmful for rms with a low protability whereas rms with an average protability are likely to remain unaected by the reform or even benet from the new rule. This corresponds to ndings of . In addition, the old rule was more harmful for rms having a high fraction of internal debt to total debt. Therefore, in our empirical analysis, we divide the dataset into dierent groups of rms comparing their respective reactions after the reform.
Development of Hypotheses
When the new interest barrier was introduced in 2008, the German legislator rst and foremost aimed at one specic goal: putting an end to the tax-induced abusive internal cross-border lending of multinational companies.
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In order to avoid conicts with the European Court of Justice, however, the new anti-avoidance rule could not specically target multinationals, but had to treat cross-border lending and purely national lending in the same way. As shown above, the interest barrier dierentiates neither by the number of countries involved, nor whether internal or external debt is at hand. Thus, companies can neither avoid the rule by expanding or concentrating their business nor by switching between external and internal lending.
The actions which can actually be taken by companies in order to avoid unfavorable consequences of the interest barrier lead to results very much in line with the intention of the legislator. A company can cut the leverage in the high tax country, it can grant more loans in order to increase its interest earnings or it can aim at achieving a higher EBITDA without adjusting its leverage. All of these measures taken by a company generate and secure the tax base in the high tax country applying the interest barrier. In this paper we aim at analyzing whether the companies aected by the new interest barrier in Germany lowered their leverage. Even though we carry out an empirical analysis on the micro level, our approach also allows for conclusions regarding to what extent the legislator reached its goals and to what extent it caused collateral damage by inuencing and punishing companies he did not genuinely aim at.
The basic technical idea behind our identication method is the following: we identify rms which would have been aected by the new interest barrier if it had already been in place in the years 2005 to 2007, i.e. before its actual coming into force in 2008. Then we analyze empirically how these rms adjusted their debt to assets ratios as compared to the control group. It is a necessity to split the treatment group from the control group based on their characteristics before the introduction of the interest barrier, because the information after it already comprehends the rms' reactions.
Our very rst hypothesis is very general. It builds on the assumption that rms try to avoid non-deductible interest. Even though non-deductible interest is recorded in an interest carryforward, its existence does not decisively inuence the hypothesis. As compared to an immediate deduction, the carryfoward brings a net present value disadvantage and its applicability is uncertain, especially for struggling rms. Once the interest barrier has come into force, companies can calculate to what extent they are negatively aected by the legislation and adjust their capital structure accordingly. Firms arriving at the conclusion that they are not aected by the interest barrier, by contrast, have no particular reason to adjust their leverage. These rms serve as the control group. Of course, there are other eects inuencing the optimal leverage such as the decline of the corporate tax rate or macroeconomic criteria inuencing the interest rate. H 1. After the introduction of the new interest barrier, the hypothetically ex ante hit rms lowered their leverage. This holds especially true concerning rms which are more severely aected by the new interest barrier than by the previous rule.
The interest barrier was set up to prohibit legal but unpleasant tax avoidance by multinational rms. The provision of loans from subsidiaries in low-tax countries such as Ireland to company units in high-tax countries such as Germany should be prevented. Interest is taxed where it is received but reduces the tax base in the high-tax country. If multinationals actually set up such nancial structures with the primary intention of saving taxes, they should easily be able to adjust them if necessary. Based on this rationale, even though the interest barrier does not explicitly distinguish between multinational and national lending, the cross-border constructions can be expected to be more elastic. Put dierently, stronger adjustments of the capital structure can be expected by multinational rms because the -repealed -tax advantage was one of their primary reason for the high leverage. National rms, by contrast, might very well have other predominant reasons for using debt such as the sheer absence of alternatives to external nancing. Regardless of their desire to lower their leverage once the interest barrier is in place, these national rms might not, or at least only to a lower extent, be able to do so. Therefore, our second hypothesis is the following: H 2. After the introduction of the new interest barrier, companies belonging to multinational groups lowered their leverage more strongly.
When companies decide to apply debt nancing, they still have a choice between internal debt and external debt. While internal debt stems from shareholders or other members of the group, external debt is provided by banks or similar lenders. The eect of the interest barrier introduction might very well dier between these two kinds of debt nancing. The interest barrier rst and foremost targets tax-abusive internal debt nancing. In order to prevent evasive constructions it does, however, not distinguish between interest from internal or external debt. Before the new interest barrier came into force in 2008, only internal debt was relevant for the calculation of the debt to equity ratio. Therefore, external debt has become less attractive with the introduction of the new interest barrier. Given that external debt was previously hardly relevant, in the course of the interest barrier introduction we should see a relatively stronger reduction in external rather than in internal debt. Thus, we state our third hypothesis: H 3. After the introduction of the new interest barrier, companies reduced more strongly their external debt than their internal debt.
Some debt nancing is permissible. The new interest barrier accounts for this by granting a basic tax allowance and by admitting the deductibility of interest expenses to the amount of interest earned plus 30% of EBITDA. By introducing the interest barrier, the legislator did not aim at generally prohibiting debt nancing, but at preventing excessive tax-induced leveraging. With our fourth hypothesis, we investigate to what extent especially those rms targeted by the new interest barrier actually reduced their debt to assets ratio. The logic behind our hypothesis is not that such highly leveraged rms reduce their debt because they are eager to fulll the wish of the legislator, rather they are supposed to adjust it because they are the ones which are most severely hit by the new interest barrier. Given that we refer to the total leverage in this hypothesis and given that most of the debt in our data is external debt, the treatment group is generally more negatively aected by the new interest barrier than by the previous thin capitalization rule. It is therefore likely to adjust its nancial structure. Thus, we suppose in our fourth hypothesis:
H 4. After the introduction of the new interest barrier, especially the 5% most highly leveraged companies reduced their debt to assets ratios.
In Section 3, we have analytically worked out that rms with a rather low protability are more likely to be aected by the new interest barrier than protable rms. As could be seen above, the lower a rm's protability, the more adverse is the new interest barrier as compared to the previous thin capitalization rule. Those rms facing a more severe rule than in the past, i.e. for which debt has become less attractive than before, are the ones which are most likely supposed to lower their leverage. In line with , companies with an average or even above-average protability, however, are not negatively aected by the interest barrier rule. When focusing solely on the eect of the new legislation in the form of the interest barrier, we can state the following hypothesis: H 5. After the introduction of the new interest barrier, especially the 5% least protable companies reduced their debt to assets ratios.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We look at the development of the debt to assets ratios and the net interest payments to assets ratios of 25,751 German corporations between 2005 and 2010 in an unbalanced panel. Our analysis considers all debt, internal debt and external debt one by one. In order to analyze the eects of the introduction of the interest barrier we put rms into different groups according to their non-deductible interest payments concerning the old and the new rule, according to their leverage and according to their protability. We further control for the rms' tangibility, protability, former losses and the number of employees.
All these data are provided by the DAFNE-database by Bureau van Dijk, a subsample of the AMADEUS-database containing detailed information of German companies needed to compute the non-deductible expenses. We use information from unconsolidated statements for all corporations with total assets of more than EUR 1 million, hence concentrating on medium-sized and large ms. We drop rms with implausible values for equity, total assets, tangible assets, EBIT, EBITDA, liabilities, protability, tangibility and interest payments. For the purpose of our analysis, we exclude rms operating in the agricultural, mining and nance sector. In addition, we use statutory corporate tax rates to control for tax rate eects on the companies' leverage. Table 1 denes all variables used in our regression analysis. Table 2 shows frequencies and absolute numbers of rms in dierent groups. In our sample, 487 companies, i.e. 1.89% of all companies, would have been treated by the new interest barrier in all three years before the introduction if it had been applicable since 2005. For 345 rms, i.e. 4.38% of the applicable companies, the new rule would have been more harmful than the old rule.
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In addition, Table 3 provides summary statistics of the applied variables. 10 The sample for computing if the new rule is more harmful than the old one is a bit smaller because we need additional information about the internal leverage. 4.38% = 345/7,878, cf. Table 4 for the sample size. (13) n.a.
The table contains relative frequencies of rms in dierent groups in the regression samples in per cent. Absolute numbers are depicted in parentheses. T reated means that the company would have had non-deductible interest expenses triggering the new interest barrier in all three years before the reform. Independent means that the company has no 25% shareholder or subsidiary. Stricter means that the company would have had more non-deductible interest expenses based on the new interest barrier compared to the old rule in all three years before the reform. High leveraged means that the rm had one of the 5% highest average debt to assets ratios before the reform. Low prof itable means that the rm had one of the 5% lowest average protabilities before the reform. In order to test our hypotheses we run regressions using a panel approach. We rely on the variation over time to analyze if and how rms altered their leverage after the introduction of the interest barrier. We apply a dierence in dierence approach in order to capture dierent reactions for dierent kinds of rms. Our baseline regression equation is
where debt to assets it is total debt divided by total assets. The variable treated i is a dummy that equals one if the considered rm would have been aected by the new interest barrier in all three years before its introduction. 11 Ref orm it is a dummy indicating by the value of one if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier. T reated i * ref orm it is the interaction of these two variables. X is the matrix of timevarying rm-specic control variables. Subscripts i, j and t denote the company, the industry and the year. Therefore, δ i , δ j and δ t are company-, industry-and time-xed eects, δ jt is an industry-time-xed eect capturing industry-specic developments of the leverage. T reated i and ref orm it are captured by the xed eects, hence β 1 and β 2 are not reported. The coecient of treated i * ref orm it shows if treated rms changed their debt to assets ratios in a dierent way than other rms. For the eects on rms which are more severe hit by the new interest barrier than by the old rule, we replace treated i by stricter i . This variable equals one if treated i is one and non-deductible interest expenses according to the new rule were higher than the those according to the old rule in all three years before the reform.
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This approach can be used to test H1. Considering H2, we split the sample into national companies and multinational companies. H3 is tested with the same equation replacing the dependent variable by internal and external debt to assets.
To test H4, we replace the treatment dummy by the variable high lev i indicating if a company had an average debt to assets ratio before the reform that was higher than the 95 percent quantile of all considered rms. In addition, we introduce a three-way interaction to examine if highly leveraged rms which might be aected by the new interest barrier 11 For the labeling if a company is treated or not, we generally use the scheme of Figure 1 . The escape clause, comparing the rm's leverage to the group's leverage is, however, disregarded. Concerning the group membership, we distinguish by the existence or non-existence of a 25% subsidiary and/or a 25% shareholder. 12 The non-deductible amount according to the old rule is calculated by comparing the rm's internal debt to the rm's equity. All interest expenses for such debt exceeding 1.5 times the equity are labeled as non-deductible.
reacted dierently from rms which do not have to worry about non-deductible expenses because they are independent and thus not aected by the new rule. Therefore the equation changes to
A positive β 4 means that independent highly leveraged rms have increased their leverage after the reform compared to other rms with lower debt to assets ratios. This coecient is generally not expected to be signicant because independent rms are never aected by the new interest barrier. For dependent rms, β 4 and β 7 must be added to see the whole eect. In addition, β 6 plus β 7 is the dierence in reaction between highly leveraged dependent and independent rms. If these two coecients are jointly signicant, there is a specic interest barrier eect for potentielly aected rms. We use this three-way interaction approach to capture the fact that highly leveraged rms might generally reduce their debt to assets ratios over time to return to their individually aspired ratio.
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The same kind of analysis is used to test H5 replacing the dummies for highly leveraged rms by a binary variable which is one if a company belongs to those rms with the 5 percent lowest average protablities before the reform.
Regression Results
Our regressions deal one by one with the hypotheses derived in Section 4. The rst three result tables, Tables 4 to 6, cover the issues outlined in hypotheses H1 to H3, while Table 7 and Table 8 trace H4 and H5. Table 4 is based on all rms, whereas Table 5 focuses on national rms and Table 6 focuses on multinationals. The same dierentiation is maintained in Tables 7 and 8. The structure within the tables is always the same: The columns to the left of a table analyze the eects on total debt to assets, the columns in the middle focus on the eects on internal debt to assets and the columns to the right present the eects on external debt to assets. All regressions are dierence-in-dierence approaches showing the eects of the interest barrier introduction on nancing decisions of dierent kinds of companies. We use a xed eects estimator in order to capture unobserved rm, industry and time specic eects. The Annex shows additional results. an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the rm would have been treated by the new rule in all three years before the introduction. A negative sign of the coecient means that the dierence between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated rms compared to companies not treated by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use the interaction stricter * ref orm to analyze if rms, for which the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule in all three years before the reform, reduced their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other rms. Other variables are described in Table 1 . Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-xed eects. Observations of German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10%-level, * * at the 5%-level and * * * at the 1%-level.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 , the ratio of total debt to assets serves as the dependent variable. The variable treated is a dummy that equals one for those rms which would have been aected by the new interest barrier in 2005, 2006 and in 2007 if it had been in place not only from 2008 onwards but already in the three previous years. This variable is captured by the rm-xed eects. Being aected means that the interest barrier prevents the immediate deductibility of at least some interest expenses. The variable ref orm is a dummy that equals one for those observations that occur after the introduction of the interest barrier. This variable is captured by the year-xed eects. The interaction of these two variables, treated * ref orm, shows if the dierence between the leverage before and after the reform is lower or higher for aected rms compared to unaf-fected companies. The negative and signicant coecient of treated * ref orm, amounting to -0.0122, means that after the introduction of the interest barrier, those hypothetically aected rms lowered their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it less strongly than the control group. When interpreting the result, one has to keep in mind that we control for rm and industry-year-xed eects. For example, if the control group lowered its debt to assets ratio after the reform by ten percentage points, the treatment group would have lowered it by 12.2 percentage points. Given that we focus on the size of the change, it can, however, not be seen from the coecient if the decrease was bigger or the increase was smaller. In either way, the negative coecient conrms our hypothesis H1, because rms concerned with the interest barrier chose, on average, a relatively lower debt to assets ratio after its introduction compared to other rms.
In the second sentence of hypothesis H1, we suppose that the lowered leverage should be observable especially concerning rms which are more severely aected by the new interest barrier than by the previous rule. The binary variable stricter equals one for rms for which in all three years 2005, 2006 and 2007, the hypothetically applied interest barrier would have led to more non-deductible interest than the previous rule which was in place at that time. The signicant coecient of the interaction eect stricter * ref orm -0.0144 indicates that rms which could expect to suer more from the interest barrier than from the ratio-based thin capitalization rule supposedly lowered their debt to assets ratios more strongly than the control group. This conrms the second sentence in hypothesis H1.
As can be seen by looking at Table 4 as a whole, columns (3) and (4) show the results for the approaches outlined above using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable and columns (5) and (6) do so using external debt to assets as the dependent variable.
Based on these general regressions, there is no signicant impact of the interest barrier on the ratio of internal debt to assets. This can be seen from the fact that none of the crucial coecients treated * ref orm and stricter * ref orm in columns (3) and (4) is signicant.
Turning to the eect on external debt to assets, the results presented in columns (5) and (6) paint a dierent picture. It seems that rms reacted to the introduction of the interest barrier predominantly with their external debt. The coecient of treated * ref orm in column (5) shows the expected sign but fails to be signicant. The crucial coecient stricter * ref orm in column (6), however, clearly conrms hypothesis H3: After the introduction of the new interest barrier, companies reduced their external debt more strongly than their internal debt. By comparing the results in columns (5) and (6) to those in columns (3) and (4), we see that the aected companies did not signicantly dier in adjusting their internal debt to assets ratios compared to non-aected rms.
Their external debt to assets ratio adjustment, however, clearly diers from the one of the control group if the new interest barrier rule is more severe than the previous thin capitalization rule for the considered company. Those rms signicantly reduced their external leverage after the reform compared to the control group. This result corresponds to the eects on all debt presented in column (2).
The control variables generally show the expected eects. The positive and sometimes also signicant coecient of tangibility can be explained by the fact that companies having lots of collateral can more easily and cheaply get loans and thus increase their leverage. P rof itability shows a negative and signicant coecient, which means that protable companies can reduce their leverage due to their ability of internally nancing by means of retained earnings. The positive and signicant coecient of loss carryf orward indicates that companies which made losses in the past need to raise debt to pay their dues and to keep their businesses running. The number of employees negatively impacts internal debt but positively aects the use of external debt. This is plausible, because, while some kind of debt is required by all kind of rms, a certain rm size may boost the ability to tap external sources. Overesch and Voeller (2010) use the interactions between loss carryf orward and str and, in addition, str and tangibility in order to show that the postive tax eect on the debt to assets ratio decreases for rms with high non-debt tax shields. We nd the same expected negative eects of both of these interactions on the total, internal and external leverage. 14 All of the control variables presented here are included in all of the regressions shown in the tables to follow. As they remain qualitatively unchanged, these control variables are not always explicitly reported. Table 9 it suces if the company was hypothetically aected in at least one of the three years. The results of this sensivity analysis in Table 9 are qualitatively generally the same as those from Table 4 discussed above. Tables 10 and 11 in the Appendix are analogue robustness checks for the results discussed below. Table 4 shows results of regressions including all rms. In our second hypothesis H2, however, we suppose that multinationals and national rms showed dierent debt to assets reactions in face of the new interest barrier. In order to be able to evaluate this hypothesis, we split our sample into those rms which are purely national (cf. Table 5) and those belonging to a multinational group (cf. Table 6 ). Depending on the regression setup, only about 10% to 20% of the rms in our sample are multinationals, whereas 80% to 90% are national rms.
The results presented in Table 5 refer to national companies. They are qualitatively comparable to those of all rms presented and discussed above. In some cases, the signicance or the size eects are higher than in the overall analysis, which indicates that it was mainly the national rms which reacted to the new interest barrier rule. For reasons of brevity, we do not discuss the results of Table 5 one by one, but only provide an overview. More detailed explanations of the coecients can be achieved by referring to the discussion of Table 4 . All in all, the results indicate that those national rms which are aected by the new interest barrier more strongly reduced their total debt to assets ratios than the control group. The specic reactions do not refer to the ratio of internal debt to assets, but they can be traced to the ratio of external debt to assets. This can be seen from the insignicant coecient in column (4) as compared to the signicant coecients in column (6) of Table 5 . Table 10 in the Appendix serves as a robustness check of Table 5 by reducing the requirement of being considered a treated national rm if it was hypothetically aected by the interest barrier at least once instead of three consecutive times between 2005 and 2007. The results presented in Table 10 are qualitatively very similar to those presented in Table 5 . Table 6 deals exclusively with multinational companies. As outlined above, there are not too many multinationals available in our sample. A look at the whole Table 6 shows that in only one case a crucial variable is (at the 10 percent level) signicant, whereas all other coecients are insignicant. The weakly signicant coecient of stricter * ref orm does not show the expected negative sign and does not prove to stay signicant in robustness checks. We conclude from Table 6 that, contrary to the expectations expressed in hypothesis H2, multinationals did not show particularly strong reactions. Our results rather indicate that multinationals did not signicantly change their debt to assets ratios, whereas the national companies did show such interest barrier-induced adjustments. Table  11 in the Appendix serves as a robustness check for the regression results dealing with multinationals. Table 11 denes the treated and stricter variable like Tables 9 and 10 . There, these variables already change to one if the company is aected in at least one of the three years before the reform. In Table 11 we nd negative eects on all debt and external debt. These results dier from the ones presented in Table 6 . However, the conclusion concerning H3 remains unchanged. Multinationals did not signicantly reduce their internal leverage, although such a reduction was intended by the new interest barrier. an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the rm would have been treated by the new rule in all three years before the introduction. A negative sign of the coecient means that the dierence between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated rms compared to companies not aected by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use the interaction stricter * ref orm to analyze if rms, for which the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule in all three years before the reform, reduced their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other rms. Other variables are described in Table 1 . Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-xed eects. Observations of German corporations not being a member of a multinational group between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10%-level, * * at the 5%-level and * * * at the 1%-level.
In contrast to Tables 5 and 6, the consideration of Table 10 and Table 11 indicates that both national and multinational rms adjusted their leverage after the reform. Based on these robustness checks we cannot reject H2. The treatment group in Table 11 consists of rms which are not necessarily aected by the new interest barrier after the reform given that it suces to be hypothetically aected only once to be a member of the treatment group. Therefore, on the one hand, based on what we nd in Table 6 , one cannot expect to nd any signicant eects for this group. On the other hand, such rms might be able to adjust their nancing structure more appropriately than those serving as the treatment group in Table 6 . This second aspect might explain why we nd reactions for multinational companies only in Table 11 . an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the rm would have been treated by the new rule in all three years before the introduction. A negative sign of the coecient means that the dierence between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated rms compared to companies not aected by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use the interaction stricter * ref orm to analyze if rms, for which the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule in all three years before the reform, reduced their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other rms. Other variables are described in Table 1 . Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the debendent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-xed eects. Observations for German corporations being a member of a multinational group between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10%-level, * * at the 5%-level and * * * at the 1%-level.
In sum, the rst three result tables yield three conclusions. First, conrming H1, after the introduction of the new interest barrier, the hypothetically ex ante hit rms, and especially those which are more severely aected by the new interest barrier, lowered their leverage. Second, concerning H2, our results in the robustness checks dier from the baseline results. Thus, we can neither reject nor conrm this hypothesis. Third, conrming H3, the decreased attractiveness of external debt made companies lower their external rather than their internal debt. The third conclusion, based on the evidence presented above, indicates that the new interest barrier has possibly caused more damage than good. It intended to inuence multinationals in such a way that they would reduce their internal debt to assets ratios. The analysis above, however, indicates that rst and foremost national companies reacted by adjusting their external debt to assets ratio. In defending the interest barrier, one could put forward the argument that the multinationals are aected by the rule by no longer being able to deduct their interest expenses. Given that such rms are very likely to do tax planning, however, such an argument is rather unlikely to hold. Table 12 in the Appendix presents an additional analysis which splits up the binary variable treated into some of its components. By dierencing whether a company is part of a group or has at least one 25% shareholder, whether it has positive net interest payments, whether it exceeds the general interest allowance and whether its net interest payments exceed 30% of EBITDA, we can derive which aspects actually drive the rms to adjust their debt to assets ratios facing the new interest barrier. Table 12 in the Annex shows negative and signicant coecients of net int > 0 * ref orm and net int once > 0 * ref orm, meaning that especially rms with more interest expenses than interest earnings reduced their debt to assets ratios after the reform. The negative and signicant interaction in column (7) suggests that it also matters for rms' reactions whether the net interest payments exceed the 30% EBITDA threshold. Table 13 in the Appendix serves as a general sensivity analysis of the results presented in Table 4 . In Table 13 , the dependent variable is not the debt to assets ratio, but the net interest payments to assets. This accounts for the rms' possibility to align themselves with the new interest barrier by lowering their charged internal interest rates instead of reducing the debt to assets ratio. As can be seen, the conclusions to be drawn from Table 13 are the same as those from Table 4 . Treated rms did not lower their internal net interest payments after the interest barrier introduction. We rather see a reduction of external net interest payments. The positive and signicant coecient of treated * ref orm for internal debt indicates that treated rms exhibit an increased ratio compared to non-treated rms. This might be due to the fact that treated rms have a low protability and need more debt to survive. See the discussion of Table 8 for details.
In tracing hypotheses H1 to H3, we only made the dierence whether a company is hypothetically treated by the interest barrier or not or if it is treated more severely than by the old one. We did not distinguish to what degree such a company may be aected. It is probable that those rms which are denied only a minor amount of interest deductibility, might not consider changing, i.e. lowering, their leverage. As a robustness check, and in order to test hypotheses H4 and H5, we run additional regressions. In these regressions, we focus on highly leveraged companies and on companies with a low protability. Analytical reasons for concentrating on these groups have been outlined in Section 3 above. an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the rm is among the 5% highest leveraged rms dened by the mean of the three years before the reform. Regression 2 compares the eect for independent and dependent rms. A negative sign of the three-way interaction high lev * ref orm * dep means that the dierence between debt to assets before and after the reform is lower for highly leveraged companies than for rms with lower debt, especially if they are dependent and therefore potentially aected by the interest barrier. The list of control variables is the same as in the other tables, the respective results are not reported. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-xed eects. Observations for German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. In the rst panel we show results for all rms, in the second and third panel we distinguish between national and multinational rms. For multinationals, there is no distinction between independent and dependent rms, as here all multinationals are dependent per denition. at the 5%-level and * * * at the 1%-level. Table 7 aims at testing hypothesis H4, stating that after the introduction of the new interest barrier, especially the 5% previously most highly leveraged companies reduced their debt to assets ratios. The newly introduced variable high lev distinguishes, whether a rm is among the 5% most highly leveraged rms in terms of the mean debt to assets ratio in the three years before the reform. The dummy dependent is zero for rms which are independent, i.e. do not belong to a group and have no shareholder holding at least 25% of the shares. The new interest barrier does not apply to such independent rms. We suppose that the dependent highly leveraged and therefore concerned rms relatively reduced their debt to assets ratios compared to the never aected independent rms. Table 7 is split into three horizontal sections with results for all companies in the rst, national companies in the second and multinationals in the third section. All the control variables of the previous three tables are included in the regressions, but not reported in Table 7 . They remained qualitatively very similar to the previous estimations in terms of size, sign and signicance. Concentrating on all companies in the upper section of Table 7 , we see that the most highly leveraged rms indeed reduced their overall leverage after the reform. This can be seen from the signicant coecient high lev * ref orm in column (1), amounting to -0.0078 and from the results presented in column (2). The coecient of the three-way interaction high lev * ref orm * dep is negative and highly signicant, indicating that the reaction to the reform diers not only between highly leveraged companies and rms with a lower debt to assets ratio, but that the dierence between these two groups especially depends on the fact if the company is independent and therefore potentially aected by the interest barrier or not. Dependent * ref orm and high lev * ref orm * dep are jointly signicant, which can be seen from the value of F 1 in Table 7 . This means that dependent highly leveraged rms relatively decreased their debt to assets ratios after the reform compared to highly leveraged but independent rms. These results conrm hypothesis H4.
The results presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 show that the most highly leveraged rms indeed reduced their internal debt to assets ratio. Thus, by contrast to the general result drawn from Tables 4 to 6, the most highly leveraged rms seem to show the reaction intended by the interest barrier. The reaction can be identied, however, only for the national rms, as can be seen from the signicant coecients -0.0307 and -0.0480 at the center of Table 7 . For multinationals, by contrast, the eect on the internal debt to assets ratio is insignicant. Only the coecient dealing with the total debt to assets ratio is negative and signicant. For such multinational companies, there is no distinction between independent and dependent rms, as here all multinationals are dependent by denition. With regards to external debt, columns (5) and (6) of Table 7 show only positive signicant coecients for the crucial variables. These ndings suggest that the most highly leveraged rms increased their external debt after the reform compared to companies with lower debt to assets ratios. This result opposes to H3 and H4. Given that we, however, observe a reduction in internal leverage, the increase of external debt might in some sense just compensate this development. Testing the same hypotheses based on the 10% instead of the 5% most highly leveraged rms led to qualitatively very similar results.
The weak evidence in Table 7 suggests that at least some highly leveraged rms cut their internal debt to assets ratios, which is in line with the goals of the new interest barrier. However, these results cannot be identied for multinational rms. Based on our ndings in Tables 4 to 6 we therefore rely on our previous conclusion that the interest barrier is harmfull especially for rms and kinds of leverage that were not targeted by this new rule.
In Table 8 , we aim at testing hypothesis H5, stating that after the introduction of the new interest barrier, especially the least protable companies reduced their debt to assets ratio. The rationale behind this hypothesis has been outlined in Section 3 and 4. The overall structure of Table 8 is similar to the previous table. The newly introduced binary variable low prof equals one if the considered rm is among the group of rms with the 5% lowest protability in terms of the mean protability in the three years before the reform. Column (1) shows the overall eect. The positive and signicant coecients run in opposition against hypothesis H5. The least protable rms have increased their debt to assets ratios. This can be observed both for the national rms and for multinationals. If the rms were supposed to make their leverage decisions solely based on the interest barrier, their behavior is counter-intuitive. From a general point of view, however, the increase in the debt to assets ratio for the least protable rms is well understandable. Firms with extremely low protability seem to have other concerns than their interest deductibility. They are in need of nancing to keep their business running. Due to a lack of internal funds and a decent attractiveness to equity investors, they necessarily increase their debt. This result is in line with the negative coecient of the control variable prof itability, meaning that more protable companies have lower debt to assets ratios than low protable rms.
The results from column (2) of Table 8 an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the rm is among the group of rms with the 5% lowest protability dened by the mean of the three years before the reform. Regression 2 compares the eect for independent and dependent rms. A negative sign of the three-way interaction low prof * ref orm * dep means that the dierence between debt to assets before and after the reform is lower for companies with the lowest protability than for rms with a higher protability, especially if they are dependent and therefore potentially aected by the interest barrier. The list of control variables is the same as in the other tables, the respective results are not reported. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-xed eects. Observations for German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. In the rst panel we show results for all rms, in the second and third panel we distinguish between national and multinational rms. For multinationals, there is no distinction between independent and dependent rms, as here all multinationals are dependent per denition. among the group of low protable rms, the dependent rms relatively decreased their debt to assets ratios compared to the independent rms. Therefore, even though the interest barrier does not play the most important role for the low protable rms overall, it still seems to be considered in the way supposed in hypotheses H5. This cannot be shown for multinational rms, however, because all multinationals are dependent rms. As can be seen from column (4) of Table 8 , the positive general eect and the negative interest barrier eect prevail when focusing on the internal debt to assets ratio. The results in columns (5) and (6), indicating an increased external debt to assets ratio for national rms with the lowest protability, oppose the general hypothesis H3 for these kinds of rms. Concerning external debt, hypothesis H5 is not conrmed by low protability rms either. Testing hypothesis H5 based on the 10% instead of the 5% least protable rms led to qualitatively very similar results.
Conclusion
We have analyzed the impact of the new interest barrier on rms' nancing structures. We distinguish between national rms and multinationals and between the eects on internal debt to assets and external debt to assets. The interest barrier has been introduced as of 2008 with the primary purpose of preventing multinationals from abusive tax avoidance by means of cross-border internal loans.
In our general regressions, we nd that the interest barrier made rms lower their debt to assets ratios and their net interest payments. Opposing its original intention, it seems to be, however, the national rather than the multinational rms which adjusted their capital structure and it is external rather than internal debt which is reduced. Therefore, at large we conclude that the interest barrier does indeed aect nancing decisions, but predominantly not in the intended way and not of the intended rms.
In a robustness check, we nd that highly leveraged rms reduce their internal debt to assets ratios. This reaction can, however, only be reliably identied for national rms. It is unclear if, at least, the most likely targeted multinationals were inuenced by the new interest barrier in the way intended.
A further robustness check reveals that, as expected, rms which are likely to be subject to the interest barrier because they have a very low protability tackle the threat of nondeductible interest by relatively reducing their debt to assets ratios. This interest barrier eect, however, is overcompensated by such rms' basic need for debt nancing to keep their business running. Therefore, in total, low protable rms relatively increased their leverage after the reform.
All in all, our empirical evidence does not give a positive reference to the new interest barrier rule. The legislator might have focused too much on the, albeit, justied and comprehensible task to counteract excessive and abusive internal lending by a few multinationals. Based on the evidence found in this study, the end may hardly justify the means. Signicantly inuencing i.e. distorting the nancing decisions of companies which were not even aimed at is considerable collateral damage. At the same time, from an empirical point of view, it remains unclear if the unbeloved multinational nancing structures could be prevented eectively. 9 Appendix an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the rm would have been treated by the new rule at least in one year before the introduction. A negative sign of the coecient means that the dierence between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated rms compared to companies not treated by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use the interaction once stricter * ref orm to analyze if rms, for which the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule at least in one year before the reform, reduced their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other rms. Other variables are described in Table  1 . Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-xed eects. Observations of German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10%-level, * * at the 5%-level and * * * at the 1%-level. an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the rm would have been treated by the new rule at least in one year before the introduction. A negative sign of the coecient means that the dierence between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated rms compared to companies not aected by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use the interaction once stricter * ref orm to analyze if rms, for which the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule at least in one year before the reform, reduced their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other rms. Other variables are described in Table  1 . Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 an 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-xed eects. Observations of German corporations not being a member of a multinational group between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10%-level, * * at the 5%-level and * * * at the 1%-level. an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the rm would have been treated by the new rule at least in one year before the introduction. A negative sign of the coecient means that the dierence between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated rms compared to companies not aected by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use the interaction once stricter * ref orm to analyze if rms, for which the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule at least in one year before the reform, reduced their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other rms. Other variables are described in Table  1 . Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the debendent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-xed eects. Observations for German corporations being a member of a multinational group between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10%-level, * * at the 5%-level and * * * at the 1%-level. The dependent variable is debt to assets. Dependent * ref orm is an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the rm is a member of a group or has at least one 25% shareholder. A negative sign of the coecient means that the dierence between leverage before and after the reform is lower for dependent rms compared to companies not captured by the new interest barrier. Regression 2 compares companies with positive net interest payments to other rms. In regression 3 we use the interaction high net int * ref orm
to analyze if rms with net interest payments exceeding EUR 1 million reduced their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extend than other rms. Regression 4 compares companies with net interest payments exceeding 30% of EBITDA. While regressions 2 to 4 dene the treatment dummies by requiring the condition in all three years before the reform, regressions 5 to 7 use a treatment dummy dened by fulllling the condition at least in one year before the reform, respectively. Other variables are described in is an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the rm would have been treated by the new rule in all three years before the introduction. A negative sign of the coecient means that the dierence between the net interest payments before and after the reform is lower for treated rms compared to companies not aected by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 we use the interaction stricter * ref orm to analyze if rms, for which the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule in all three years before the reform, reduced their net interest payments to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extend than other rms. Other variables are described in Table 1 . Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-xed eects. Observations for German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10%-level, * * at the 5%-level and * * * at the 1%-level.
